From the Descriptive to the Normative in Psychology and Logic
- 1 March 1982
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 49 (1) , 24-42
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289032
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to describe a methodology for revising logical principles in the light of empirical psychological findings. Historical philosophy of science and wide reflective equilibrium in ethics are considered as providing possible models for arguing from the descriptive to the normative. Neither is adequate for the psychology/logic case, and a new model is constructed, employing criteria for evaluating inferential systems. Once we have such criteria, the notion of reflective equilibrium becomes redundant.This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
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