Doctor Behaviour under a Pay for Performance Contract: Treating, Cheating and Case Finding?
- 20 January 2010
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 120 (542) , F129-F156
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02340.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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