Power Markets and Market Power*
- 1 July 1995
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Energy Journal
- Vol. 16 (3) , 39-66
- https://doi.org/10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol16-no3-2
Abstract
Privatization was intended to make the English bulk electricity market sufficiently competitive to avoid the need for regulation, but two generators set the spot price over 90% of the time though they supply less than 60% of total electricity generated. Their market power depends on their share ofnon-baseload plant, and agreed divestiture here should increase competition. The paper argues that the contract market, which makes entry contestable, will ensure that long-run average prices are kept at the competitive entry level, with increased competition mainly increasing medium-run volatility and short-run economic efficiency.This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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