The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments
- 30 April 1987
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 13 (2) , 93-128
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(87)90049-7
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
Funding Information
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
- Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences
- Office of Naval Research (N00014-77-C-0518)
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