CONSTITUENT INTEREST VS. LEGISLATOR IDEOLOGY: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY COST
- 1 July 1988
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 26 (3) , 461-470
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1988.tb01508.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- IDEOLOGY AND LEGISLATOR SHIRKINGEconomic Inquiry, 1987
- The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of ProtectionAmerican Political Science Review, 1986
- Tariffs, quotas and domestic-content protection: some political economy considerationsPublic Choice, 1986
- DOMESTIC CONTENT LEGISLATION: HOUSE VOTING AND THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATIONEconomic Inquiry, 1985
- Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959–1980American Political Science Review, 1985
- The Theory of Domestic Content Protection and Content PreferenceThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1981
- Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional VotingThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1979
- Pressure Groups and the Pattern of TariffsJournal of Political Economy, 1975
- The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820–1875The Journal of Economic History, 1975
- The Theory of Economic RegulationThe Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1971