Fiscal federalism and incentives in a Russian region
- 19 March 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Comparative Economics
- Vol. 31 (1) , 20-33
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0147-5967(02)00011-2
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- Central Control of Regional Budgets: Theory with Applications to RussiaJournal of Comparative Economics, 2002
- Managerial career concerns, privatization and restructuring in transition economiesEuropean Economic Review, 2000
- Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian styleJournal of Public Economics, 2000
- Subnational Budgeting in Russia: Preempting a Potential CrisisSSRN Electronic Journal, 1999
- Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market IncentivesJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1997
- Government in transitionEuropean Economic Review, 1997
- The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet RussiaBritish Journal of Political Science, 1996
- Coordination, Incentives, and the Ratchet EffectThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1993
- The "Ratchet Principle" and Performance IncentivesThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1980
- Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent RelationshipThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979