Centrifugal forces and collective decision‐making: The case of the Dutch cabinet*

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Abstract
In political science the field of cabinet decision‐making is still largely terra incognita, and there is no theoretical framework to help us interpret the available material in a meaningful way. As a first step, this article suggests that cabinet decision‐making is structured by two sources of disagreement: the departments headed by the cabinet ministers, and the parties or factions these ministers represent. After a brief overview of different combinations of departmental and political heterogeneity in different countries, the Dutch cabinet is examined in more detail. It is characterized by strong departmental heterogeneity and more recently by political heterogeneity as well. Various attempts to contain these centrifugal forces ‐ recognition of the cabinet, a strong position for the Prime Minister and for the Minister of Finance, cabinet committees, and an Inner Cabinet ‐ have not been successful. This could be because political and departmental heterogeneity are mutually reinforcing. However, there is also some evidence that, in the Dutch case at least, these centrifugal forces are counterbalancing, or even completely unrelated to each other.

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