Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers
- 1 May 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 13 (2) , 225-246
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(97)00003-7
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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