CAPITAL STRUCTURE MANAGEMENT AS A MOTIVATION FOR CALLING CONVERTIBLE DEBT
- 1 March 1994
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Financial Research
- Vol. 17 (1) , 91-104
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.1994.tb00176.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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