Covenants without Swords
Top Cited Papers
- 1 May 2002
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Rationality and Society
- Vol. 14 (2) , 192-228
- https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463102014002003
Abstract
In one-shot social dilemma experiments, cooperation rates dramatically increase if subjects are allowed to communicate before making a choice. There are two possible explanations for this `communication effect'. One is that communication enhances group identity, the other is that communication elicits social norms. I discuss both views and argue in favor of a norm-based explanation.Keywords
This publication has 35 references indexed in Scilit:
- Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social DilemmasPersonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1996
- Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and MannersJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1995
- The free-rider problem in intergroup conflicts over step-level and continuous public goods.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1992
- The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same TimePersonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1991
- A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human BehaviorPublished by Elsevier ,1991
- Norms of CooperationEthics, 1990
- Choice behavior in social dilemmas: Effects of social identity, group size, and decision framing.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1986
- Social DilemmasAnnual Review of Psychology, 1980
- In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis.Psychological Bulletin, 1979
- Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1977