Alternative Models of Restructured Electricity Systems, Part 1: No Market Power
- 1 December 2001
- journal article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 49 (6) , 821-838
- https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.49.6.821.10017
Abstract
Different equilibrium concepts have been proposed by various authors (Schweppe et al., Hogan et al., Chao and Peck, Wu et al.) to analyse competitive electricity systems. We establish correspondences between these different models through a single framework and provide additional interpretations of these equilibrium concepts. This unifying conceptual view also provides a computationally feasible approach to simulate the market. It also opens the way to the modeling of some imperfect markets.Keywords
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