Backwards-induction outcome in a quantum game
- 13 May 2002
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review A
- Vol. 65 (5) , 052328
- https://doi.org/10.1103/physreva.65.052328
Abstract
In economics, duopoly is a market dominated by two firms large enough to influence the market price. Stackelberg presented a dynamic form of duopoly that is also called the “leader-follower” model. We give a quantum perspective on the Stackelberg duopoly that gives a backwards-induction outcome same as the Nash equilibrium in the static form of duopoly also known as the Cournot’s duopoly. We find the two-qubit quantum pure states required for this purpose.Keywords
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