On the Size of Winning Coalitions
- 1 June 1974
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 68 (2) , 505-518
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1959499
Abstract
A recent note by Robert Butterworth is critical of William Riker's size principle on several important grounds. There is, however, an important omission in his analysis which this present essay aims to correct. The author goes on to tie assertions about coalition structure in n-person zero-sum games to a solution theory for such games. In the appendix to this essay the general five-person game, of which Butterworth's game is a special case, is considered in some detail. The effect, with one reasonable solution theory, is a favorable appraisal of the size principle.Keywords
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- Cooperative games in effectiveness formJournal of Economic Theory, 1972
- Comment on Butterworth, “A Research Note on the Size of Winning Coalitions”American Political Science Review, 1971
- Stable coalition proposals in majority-rule votingJournal of Economic Theory, 1971
- A Research Note on the Size of Winning CoalitionsAmerican Political Science Review, 1971
- The proof that a game may not have a solutionTransactions of the American Mathematical Society, 1969
- Chapter 3. Existence of Stable Payoff Configurations for Cooperative GamesPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1967
- Chapter 1. A Survey of Cooperative Games Without Side PaymentsPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1967