Electoral cycles and international policy cooperation
- 1 October 1993
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 37 (7) , 1373-1391
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(93)90061-e
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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