Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions
- 1 March 1999
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 89 (1) , 291-305
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.1.291
Abstract
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This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction CompetitionStanford Law Review, 1996
- The Simple Economics of Optimal AuctionsJournal of Political Economy, 1989
- Government procurement and international tradeJournal of International Economics, 1989
- Optimal Auction DesignMathematics of Operations Research, 1981