Concerning knowledge of mental states
- 1 September 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice
- Vol. 63 (3) , 199-213
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8341.1990.tb01613.x
Abstract
How does a child acquire knowledge that other people are subjects of experience, and come to differentiate amongst mental states? In this paper I review some philosophical perspectives on these matters. In order to illustrate how the arguments have contemporary relevance, I criticize the ''theory of mind'' approach currently favoured by many psychologists and point out certain implications for our view of early childhood autism.This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
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