CEO compensation and bank risk Is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking?
- 1 November 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 36 (2) , 405-431
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(95)01219-2
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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