Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence: A Reply to Andrew Wayne

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Abstract
Andrew Wayne (1995) discusses some recent attempts to account, within a Bayesian framework, for the “common methodological adage” that “diverse evidence better confirms a hypothesis than does the same amount of similar evidence” (112). One of the approaches considered by Wayne is that suggested by Howson and Urbach (1989/1993) and dubbed the “correlation approach” by Wayne. This approach is, indeed, incomplete, in that it neglects the role of the hypothesis under consideration in determining what diversity in a body of evidence is relevant diversity. In this paper, it is shown how this gap can be filled, resulting in a more satisfactory account of the evidential role of diversity of evidence. In addition, it is argued that Wayne's criticism of the correlation approach does not indicate a serious flaw in the approach.

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