Power‐sharing versus Majority Rule: Patterns of Cabinet Formation in Twenty Democracies
- 1 October 1981
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Government and Opposition
- Vol. 16 (4) , 395-413
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1981.tb00319.x
Abstract
THE TERM ‘MAJORITY RULE’ IS OFTEN USED EITHER AS A synonym of democracy or as one of its defining characteristics. An important contribution that the scholars belonging to the consociational school have made to democratic theory is to point out that this close identification of majorit rule and democracy is fallacious. Majoritarian democracy, of which the Westminster model is the ideal type, is not the only form of democracy; the major alternative is consociational democracy. Furthermore, majority rule is not necessarily the best form of democracy; especially in plural societies - that is, societies deeply divided by religious, ideological, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or racial cleavages into separate sub-societies with their own political parties, interest groups, and media of communication - consociational democracy is the more suitable democratic model.Keywords
This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Historic Compromise and Consociational DemocracyInternational Political Science Review, 1980
- Coalitions and Government Formation: An Empirically Relevant TheoryBritish Journal of Political Science, 1978
- The Principles of Majority and ProportionalityBritish Journal of Political Science, 1971