PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective
- 1 June 1985
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 79 (2) , 400-414
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1956656
Abstract
This study uses information about the organizational arrangements of five major political action committees to develop an explanation for the extent to which PAC contributions are capable of influencing congressional voting decisions. The explanation claims that the processes by which PACs raise and allocate money must be understood before the impact of money on roll call decisions can be appreciated. In contrast to some previous studies, this analysis demonstrates with marked clarity the limited nature of PAC influence.Keywords
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