Abstract
IN AN ITERATIVE, INDIVIDUALISTICALLY MOTIVATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA TYPE GAME PLAYED FOR MONETARY REINFORCERS, A NO-PLAY OPTION WAS FOUND TO SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RESOLVING THE CONFLICT. BY MANIPULATING MATRIX VALUES, 3 POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS OF THE NO-PLAY OPTION WERE FACTORED OUT AND EXAMINED: WITHDRAWAL, INITIATION OF A CHANGE IN STRATEGY, AND THREAT AND PUNISHMENT. WITHDRAWAL WAS INFREQUENTLY FOUND TO BE THE REASON FOR A NO-PLAY CHOICE. THREAT AND PUNISHMENT WERE MORE OFTEN THE EXPLANATION OF THE CHOICE, BUT WERE INEFFECTIVE IN RESOLVING THE CONFLICT. INITIATION OF CHANGE WAS FREQUENTLY THE MOTIVE FOR A NO-PLAY CHOICE AND WAS FOUND TO FACILITATE RESOLUTION. NO SEX DIFFERENCES IN RESOLVING THE CONFLICT WERE OBSERVED. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

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