Understanding Induction
- 1 March 1991
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 42 (1) , 21-48
- https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/42.1.21
Abstract
The paper offers a new understanding of induction in the empirical sciences, one which assimilates it to induction in geometry rather than to statistical inference. To make the point a system of notions, essential to logically sound induction, is defined. Notable among them are arbitrary object and particular property. A second aim of the paper is to bring to light a largely neglected set of assumptions shared by both induction and deduction in the empirical sciences. This is made possible by appealing to the logic of common nouns and applying it to the logic of natural-kind terms.This strategy yields a new insight into the concept of natural kinds. While the strategy reveals deep affinity between empirical induction and deduction it also reveals two problems peculiar to induction. This helps to explain the intuition that induction is the more problematic of the two. The paper does not set out ‘to solve the problem of induction’.Keywords
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