Self-Binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of International Cooperation

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Abstract
Most game-theoretic applications to problems of international relations have focused on Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken. Despite the symmetrical properties of such games, we argue that they might oversimplify the complexities of fundamental international problems on a number of counts. This study attempts, therefore, to expand the horizon of modeling international relations through game theory by introducing three types of games whose common characteristic is that their equilibrium outcomes are Pareto-(or socially) inferior, but in which actors who have dominant strategies are harmed more than those who do not. We introduce a solution concept entitled self-binding commitment according to which harmed actors commit themselves to a dominated strategy regardless of what other actors would do. We show that if a self-binding commitment can be made credible, the actor using it can benefit both himself and the society in general. The theoretical analysis is illustrated by two real-world cases (Sadat's initiative of 1977, and the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, 1985), as well as by more general situations such as balance of power, nuclear proliferation, and the role and effectiveness of international organizations. The implications of these ideas for international relations theory are briefly discussed.

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