Corruption and optimal law enforcement
- 1 July 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 81 (1) , 1-24
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00127-4
Abstract
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This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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