Information dependent games: Can common sense be common knowledge?
- 31 December 1988
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 27 (3) , 215-221
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5
Abstract
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