Reconciling Cognitive and Perceptual Theories of Emotion: A Representational Proposal
- 1 December 1997
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 64 (4) , 555-579
- https://doi.org/10.1086/392572
Abstract
The distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is entrenched in the literature on emotion and is openly used by individual emotion theorists when classifying their own theories and those of others. In this paper, I argue that the distinction between cognitive and perceptualtheoriesof emotion is more pernicious than it is helpful, while at the same time insisting that there are nonetheless important perceptual and cognitivefactorsin emotion that need to be distinguished. A general representational metatheoretical framework for reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories is proposed. This is the Representational Theory of Emotion (RTE). A detailed case study of Antonio Damasio's important new contribution to emotion theory is presented in defense of the RTE. The paper is intended for readers interested in the foundations of emotion theory and cognitive science.This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
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