On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
- 1 January 2006
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 74 (1) , 213-233
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00654.x
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