Classical statistics as a theory of incentives
- 1 March 1990
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 2 (1) , 13-28
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90011-i
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium PointsManagement Science, 1968
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic ModelManagement Science, 1967