Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology
- 1 January 1995
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Hypatia
- Vol. 10 (3) , 117-137
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb00740.x
Abstract
I develop two different epistemic roles for emotion and desire. Caring for moral ends and people plays a pivotal though contingent role in ensuring reliable awareness of morally salient details; possession of various emotions and motives is a necessary condition for autonomous understanding of moral concepts themselves. Those who believe such connections compromise the “objective” status of morality tend to assume rather than argue for the bifurcated conception of reason and affect this essay challenges.Keywords
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