Natural Selection and Distributive Explanation: A Reply to Neander
- 1 September 1995
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 46 (3) , 384-397
- https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/46.3.384
Abstract
The thesis that natural selection explains the frequencies of traits in populations, but not why individual organisms have the traits tehy do, is here defended and elaborated. A general concept of ‘distributive explanation’ is discussed.This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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