Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates
- 1 January 1979
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 10 (1) , 247-263
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00126341
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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