Job Safety and Contract Workers in the Petrochemical Industry
- 1 January 1995
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 34 (1) , 40-57
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232x.1995.tb00359.x
Abstract
The legal rules for assigning liability for the costs of accidents penalize petrochemical plants that exercise direct control over contract employees. Evidence from diverse sources indicates that these liability rules lead plant management to give primary responsibility for the safety training and supervision of contract employees to contractors. However, analysis of the determinants of accidents suggests that host plants offer more effective safety training and supervision than do contractors. It follows that accident rates in the petrochemical industry would be reduced if liability rules were altered so that host plants had greater incentives to take primary responsibility for the safety training and supervision of contract workers.This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Occupational Safety and Worker Preferences: Is There a Marginal Worker?The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1987
- The Temporary Help Industry: A Response to the Dual Internal Labor MarketILR Review, 1985
- The Temporary Help Industry: A Response to the Dual Internal Labor MarketILR Review, 1985