Common Knowledge
- 1 November 1992
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 6 (4) , 53-82
- https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.6.4.53
Abstract
An event is common knowledge among a group of agents if each one knows it, if each one knows that the others know it, if each one knows that each one knows that the others know it, and so on. Thus, common knowledge is the limit of a potentially infinite chain of reasoning about knowledge. The purpose of this paper is to survey some of the implications for economic behavior of the hypotheses that events are common knowledge, that actions are common knowledge, that optimization is common knowledge, and that rationality is common knowledge. It will begin with several puzzles that illustrate the strength of the common knowledge hypothesis. It will then study how common knowledge can illuminate many problems in economics. In general, the discussion will show that a talent for interactive thinking is advantageous, but if everyone can think interactively and deeply all the way to common knowledge, then sometimes puzzling consequences may result.Keywords
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
- We can't disagree foreverPublished by Elsevier ,2004
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian RationalityEconometrica, 1987
- Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate InformationEconometrica, 1986
- Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledgeJournal of Economic Theory, 1985
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete informationInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1985
- Learning to agreeEconomics Letters, 1983
- Information, trade and common knowledgeJournal of Economic Theory, 1982
- An Axiomatic Characterization of Common KnowledgeEconometrica, 1981
- Agreeing to DisagreeThe Annals of Statistics, 1976
- Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional CalculiMathematical Logic Quarterly, 1963