Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
- 1 May 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 3 (2) , 183-220
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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