Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting
Top Cited Papers
- 1 November 2004
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 119 (4) , 1301-1338
- https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553042476206
Abstract
This paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade-old democracy—Russia—finds strong evidence of cycles, and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence. Using regional monthly panel data, we find that (1) the budget cycle is sizable and short-lived; public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters; (2) the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy, government transparency, media freedom, voter awareness, and over time; and (3) preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents' chances for reelection. The short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
- The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 1989–1998Journal of Public Economics, 2002
- The Political Business Cycle after 25 YearsNBER Macroeconomics Annual, 2000
- Political Business Cycles and Endogenous ElectionsSouthern Economic Journal, 1998
- The Political Economy of Fiscal AdjustmentsBrookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1998
- Political Cycles and the MacroeconomyPublished by MIT Press ,1997
- Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the EconomyPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1995
- Political Cycles in OECD EconomiesThe Review of Economic Studies, 1992
- Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment EquationsThe Review of Economic Studies, 1991
- Political SurvivalPublished by University of California Press ,1987
- Regression DiagnosticsPublished by Wiley ,1980