Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- 1 March 1990
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 7 (1) , 31-38
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01832918
Abstract
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This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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