Bounded rationality, neural network and folk theorem in repeated games with discounting
- 1 November 1994
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 4 (6) , 935-957
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213820
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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