Redemocratization, Electoral Engineering, and Party Strategies in Chile, 1989-1995

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
Can the deliberate manipulation of electoral rules help achieve political moderation and stability? An unusual electoral system in Chile provides a dramatic, albeit controversial, instance of political engineering. The binominal system, promulgated by the outgoing Pinochet government, mandates two-member districts for the upper and lower legislative chambers. Binominal electoral rules occupy a middle ground between majoritarian and PR systems. In Chile, the binominal system has provided incentives to form broad alliances, and has encouraged centripetal political competition, without generating extreme disproportionality between votes and seats. Using Lijphart's index, disproportionality was 5.80 in 1989 and 5.75 in 1993—higher than most PR systems, but lower than most plurality systems.
Keywords