VERBAL SELF‐REPORTS ABOUT MATCHING TO SAMPLE: EFFECTS OF THE NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN A COMPOUND SAMPLE STIMULUS

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Abstract
Adults' self‐reports about their choices in a delayed matching‐to‐sample task were studied as a function of the number of elements (one, two, or three) in a compound sample stimulus. Signal‐detection analyses were used to examine control of self‐reports by the number of sample elements, by the speed and accuracy of choices reported about, and by several events contingent on self‐reports. On each matching‐to‐sample trial, a sample element appeared as one of two comparison stimuli. Choice of the matching element, if made within 500 ms of the onset of the comparison stimuli, produced points worth money or chances in a drawing for money, depending on the subject. After each choice, subjects pressed either a “yes” or “no” button to answer a computer‐generated query about whether the choice met the point contingency. The number of sample elements in the matching‐to‐sample task varied across trials, and events contingent on self‐reports varied across experimental conditions. In Experiment 1, the conditions were defined by different combinations of feedback messages and point consequences contingent on self‐reports, but self‐reports were systematically influenced only by the sample‐stimulus manipulation. Self‐report errors increased with the number of sample elements. False alarms (inaccurate reports of success) were far more common than misses (inaccurate reports of failure), and false alarms were especially likely after choices that were correct but too slow to meet the point contingency. Sensitivity (A′) of self‐reports decreased as the number of sample elements increased. In addition, self‐reports were more sensitive to choice accuracy than to choice speed. All subjects showed a pronounced bias (B'H) for reporting successful responses, although the bias was reduced as the number of sample elements increased and successful choices became less frequent. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the failure of point contingencies to influence self‐reports in the first experiment was not due to a general ineffectiveness of the point consequences. Rates of inaccurate self‐reports decreased when they resulted in point losses and increased when they resulted in point gains.