Tax Rate and Government Expenditure
- 1 August 1987
- Vol. 40 (3) , 349-367
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00685.x
Abstract
SUMMARY: This article is concerned with the development and empirical application of a behavioural model of government policies. A short discussion of the existing models in this field, such as reaction‐function models, voting models, and interest group models, is given. A simple model of government behaviour is presented, using the so called interest function approach. In the model a central role is allocated to the own interests of government sector workers (politicians and bureaucrats). The interests of social groups outside the government organization are taken into account by the government through factors such as mobility (probability of becoming a member of another group) and pressure through political parties or otherwise. This leads to the formulation of what is called a complex interest function for the government which is maximized to determine its behaviour. The model is applied to The Netherlands (1921‐1985). A striking outcome is that the numerical strengths of the three social groups that are actively involved in the production process, to wit government and private sector workers, and self‐employed, appear to be determinant for the overall tax rate and the relative level of government expenditure.Keywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. IndustryEconometrica, 1986
- Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costsJournal of Public Economics, 1985
- Endogenous government policy in a model of the UK economyApplied Economics, 1984
- Tests of a rational theory of the size of governmentPublic Choice, 1983
- Politico‐economic Models in Competition with Alternative Models: Which Predict Better?*European Journal of Political Research, 1982
- Regulation, redistribution, and public choicePublic Choice, 1981
- Axiomatic Models of BargainingPublished by Springer Nature ,1979
- An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United StatesThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1978
- The Political Business CycleThe Review of Economic Studies, 1975
- Economic competition and political competitionPublic Choice, 1972