The effect of liability-sharing rules in delegating hazardous activities
- 1 September 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 19 (3) , 349-368
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0144-8188(99)00014-9
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Joint liability in torts: Marginal and infra-marginal efficiencyInternational Review of Law and Economics, 1991
- Liability and Large-Scale, Long-Term HazardsJournal of Political Economy, 1990
- Auctioning Incentive ContractsJournal of Political Economy, 1987
- Liability Rules and Risk Sharing in Environmental and Resource Policy: DiscussionAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1986
- Using Cost Observation to Regulate FirmsJournal of Political Economy, 1986
- Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent AnalysisThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1986
- Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic AnalysisThe Journal of Legal Studies, 1980
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining ProblemEconometrica, 1979