Realism and folk psychology in the ascription of concepts

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Abstract
This paper discusses some requirements on a folk‐psychological, computational account of concepts. Although most psychological views take the folk‐psychological stance that concept‐possession requires capacities of both representation and classification, such views lack a philosophical context. In contrast, philosophically motivated views stress one of these capacities at the expense of the other. This paper seeks to provide some philosophical motivation for the (folk‐) psychological stance. Philosophical and psychological constraints on a computational level account provide the context for evaluating two theses. The first, the Classificatory View, is that concept‐possession is constituted by the ability to classify states of the world. I argue, against this view, that to be able to classify, a thinker must also be able to represent the world. The second thesis, the Representational View, is that to possess a concept is constituted by the ability to represent the world. I argue that ascribing this ability is incoherent without ascribing an ability to classify. Hence, a detailed computational specification of concept‐possession suggests that the folk‐psychological stance is accurate. Philosophical views of concepts, (e.g. Fodor, 1987), adhering to one of the strong theses, whilst adverting to folk‐psychological motivations, are thus both insufficiently complex and incoherent.

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