Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
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- 10 July 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review Letters
- Vol. 85 (2) , 441-444
- https://doi.org/10.1103/physrevlett.85.441
Abstract
We prove that the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution is secure. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.Keywords
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This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
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