Strategic responses to automobile emissions control: A game-theoretic analysis
Open Access
- 31 December 1988
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 15 (4) , 419-438
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(88)90036-8
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
- Repeated Principal-Agent Games with DiscountingEconometrica, 1985
- Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet EffectThe Review of Economic Studies, 1985
- Repeated Moral HazardEconometrica, 1985
- Regulation and information in a continuing relationshipInformation Economics and Policy, 1984
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown CostsEconometrica, 1982
- Sequential EquilibriaEconometrica, 1982
- Design of incentive schemes and the new Soviet Incentive modelEuropean Economic Review, 1982
- Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Imperfect InformationThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1982
- The "Ratchet Principle" and Performance IncentivesThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1980