Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test
- 1 May 1996
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 58 (2) , 373-397
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2960231
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
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