A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon
- 31 December 1986
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 20 (1) , 9-13
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90070-4
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of BargainingEconometrica, 1985
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining ModelEconometrica, 1982
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975
- Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's TheoriesEconometrica, 1956
- The Bargaining ProblemEconometrica, 1950