Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors
Top Cited Papers
- 1 August 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 57 (2) , 275-305
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00058-1
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 36 references indexed in Scilit:
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