Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology

1 January 1980

journal article
research article
Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

Vol. 1980 (2) , 613-662
https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1980.2.192615

Abstract

A realistic and dialectical conception of the epistemology of science is advanced according to which the acquisition of instrumental knowledge is parasitic upon the acquisition, by successive approximation, of theoretical knowledge. This conception is extended to provide an epistemological characterization of reference and of natural kinds, and it is integrated into recent naturalistic treatments of knowledge. Implications for several current issues in the philosophy of science are explored.

Keywords

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