Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation
Top Cited Papers
- 1 October 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 49 (7) , 1373-1406
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3932(02)00171-x
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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