The Non-Necessity of Qualitative Content
- 1 September 1973
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue Canadienne de Philosophie
- Vol. 12 (3) , 447-453
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300036805
Abstract
Central to the Empiricist conception of matter and epistemology is the distinction between the primary and secondary properties. This distinction is part of the apparatus needed to formulate and answer the question «What aspects of perceptual information yield true knowledge of reality?” Correlatively, the distinction enables the reconciliation of the commonsense and scientific conceptions of matter in the fundamental Lockean tenet that matter possesses only the primary qualities.Keywords
This publication has 1 reference indexed in Scilit:
- The idea of a solidAustralasian Journal of Philosophy, 1965